Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
Besides, our opponents have granted that every part of the universal
Soul conforms to the whole. Now, in continuous quantities, it is by
no means necessary that the part should resemble the whole. Thus,
in the circle and the quadrilateral (the parts are not circles or
quadrilaterals). All the parts of the divided object (from which a part
is taken) are not even similar to each other, but vary in manifold
ways, such as the different triangles of which a single triangle might
be composed. Our opponents also acknowledge that the universal Soul is
composed of parts that conform to the whole. Now, in a line, one part
might also be a line, while differing from the whole in magnitude.
But when we speak of the soul, if the difference of the part from
the whole consisted in a difference of size, the soul would be a
magnitude and a body; for then she would differentiate in quantity by
psychic characteristics. But this would be impossible if all souls be
considered similar and universal. It is evident that the soul cannot,
like magnitudes, be further divided; and even our opponents would not
claim that the universal Soul is thus divided into parts. This would
amount to destroying the universal Soul, and reducing her to a mere
name, if indeed in this system a prior universal (Soul) can at all be
said to exist. This would place her in the position of wine, which
might be distributed in several jars, saying that the part of the wine
contained in each of them is a portion of the whole.[104]
NOR IS THE SOUL A PART IN THE SENSE THAT ONE PROPOSITION IS A PART OF A
SCIENCE.
Nor should we (apply to the soul) the word "part" in the sense that
some single proposition is a part of the total science. In this
case the total science does not remain any less the same (when it
is divided), and its division is only as it were the production and
actualization of each of its component parts. Here each proposition
potentially contains the total science, and (in spite of its division),
the total science remains whole.
THE DIFFERENCE OF FUNCTIONS OF THE WORLD-SOUL AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS
MAKES ENTIRE DIVISION BETWEEN THEM IMPOSSIBLE.
If such be the relation of the universal Soul to the other souls, the
universal Soul, whose parts are such, will not belong to any particular
being, but will subsist in herself. No longer will she be the soul
of the world. She will even rank with the number of souls considered
parts. As all souls would conform to each other, they would, on the
same grounds, be parts of the Soul that is single and identical. Then
it would be inexplicable that some one soul should be Soul of the
world, while some other soul should be one of the parts of the world.
ARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS PART OF THE WORLD-SOUL AS IS THE LOCAL
CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOME PART OF THE BODY TO THE WHOLE CONSCIOUSNESS?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account