Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
9. If however anybody applied the term "contingency" to the Divinity,
we should not dispute about the word, but go back of it to its
underlying meaning. Do you, by it, mean that the First is a principle
of particular nature and power; and that if He had had a different
nature, He would still, as principle, have conformed to the nature He
would have had? Also, that if He had been less perfect, He would still
have actualized in conformity with His being? We should answer such
an assertion thus: it was impossible for the higher Principle of all
things to be contingent; or to be less perfect accidentally, or good
in some other manner, as some higher thing that was less complete.
As the principle of all things must be better than they, He must be
determinate; and by this is here meant that He exists in an unique
manner. This, however, not by necessity; for necessity did not exist
before Him. Necessity exists only in the beings that follow the first
Principle, though the latter impose no constraint upon them. It is by
Himself that the First exists uniquely. He could not be anything but
what He is; He is what He ought to have been; and not by accident.
He is that; He had to be what He was. So "He who is what He ought to
have been" is the principle of the things that ought to exist. Not by
accident, nor contingently, therefore, is He what He is; He is what He
had to be; though here the term "had to be" is improper. (If we be
permitted to explain what we mean by an illustration, we may say that)
the other beings have to await the appearance of their king--which
means, that He shall posit Himself as what He really is, the true King,
the true Principle, the true Good. Of Him it must not even be said
that He actualizes in conformity with the Good, for then He would seem
subordinate to some other principle; we must say only that He is what
He is. He is not conformed to the Good, because He is the Good itself.
NOT EVEN ESSENCE IS CONTINGENT, LET ALONE SUPER-ESSENCE.
Besides, there is nothing contingent, even in (that which is beneath
the First), namely, Essence-in-itself; for if any contingency
inhered in it, it itself would be contingent. But Essence cannot
be contingent, for not fortuitously is it what it is; nor does it
derive what it is from anything else, because the very nature of
Essence is to be Essence. This being the case, how could "He who is
above Essence" be considered as being what He is fortuitously? For He
begat Essence, and Essence is not what it is fortuitously, since it
exists in the same manner as "Being," which is what is "Being" and
Intelligence--otherwise, one might even say that Intelligence was
contingent, as if it could have been anything but what is its nature.
Thus He who does not issue from Himself, and does not incline towards
anything whatever, is what He is in the most special sense.
THE SUPREME IS THE POWER REALLY MASTER OF HIMSELF.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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