Let us begin by asking these philosophers whether the ten kinds apply equally to sense-(essences), and intelligible (essences), or whether they all apply to the sense-(essences), and some only to the intelligible (essences); for here there are no longer mutual relations. We must therefore inquire which of those ten kinds apply to intelligible essences, and see whether intelligible essences can be reduced to one single kind, that would also apply to sense-essences; and whether the word "being"[238] can be applied simultaneously to intelligible and sense-entities, as a "homonymous" label. For if "being" be a homonym,[239] there are several different kinds. If, however, it be a synonym (or, name of common qualities) it would be absurd that this word should bear the same meaning in the essences which possess the highest degree of existence, and in those which possess its lower degree; for the things among which it is possible to distinguish both primary and lower degrees could not belong to a common kind. But these (Aristotelian) philosophers do not, in their division, regard the (Platonic) intelligible entities. They therefore did not mean to classify all beings; they passed by those that possess the highest degree of existence.[295] 1. Being.[240] 2. Let us further examine if these ten divisions be kinds, and how being could form a kind; for we are forced to begin our study here. INTELLIGIBLE AND SENSE-BEING COULD NOT FORM A SINGLE KIND. We have just said that intelligible being and sense-being could not form a single kind.[241] Otherwise, above both intelligible being, and sense-being, there might be some third entity which would apply to both, being neither corporeal nor incorporeal; for if it were incorporeal, the body would be incorporeal; and if it were corporeal, the incorporeal would be corporeal. QUESTIONS RAISED BY ARISTOTELIAN THEORIES. In the first place, what common element is there in matter, form, and the concretion of matter and form? The (Aristotelians) give the name of "being" alike to these three entities, though recognizing that they are not "being" in the same degree. They say that form is more being than is matter,[242] and they are right; they would not insist (as do the Stoics) that matter is being in the greater degree. Further, what element is common to the primary and secondary beings, since the secondary owe their characteristic title of "being" to the primary ones? WHAT IS "BEING" IN GENERAL? In general, what is being? This is a question to which the (Aristotelians) could find no answer; for such mere indication of properties is not an essential definition of what it is, and it would seem that the property of being a thing that is susceptible of successively admitting their contraries, while remaining identical, and numerically one,[243] could not apply to all (intelligible) beings.