Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
On the other hand, if matter and the active principle need nothing
exterior, if the subject that they constitute can itself become all
things by assuming different forms, as a dancer, who can assume all
possible attitudes, this subject would no longer be a subject, but
He will be all things. Just as the dancer is not the subject of the
attitudes (for they are his actualizations), likewise the "matter"
of the Stoics will no longer be the subject of all things, if all
things proceed from matter; or rather, the other things will no longer
really exist, they will be nothing but "modified matter," just as the
attitudes are nothing but the "modified dancer." Now if the other
things no longer really exist, matter is no longer a subject; it is
no longer the matter of the essences, but is matter exclusively. It
will no longer even be matter, because what is matter must be matter
of something; but that which refers to something else belongs to the
same classification as that thing, just as half belongs to the same
classification as the double, and is not the being of the double. But
how could non-essence, except by accident, refer to essence? But the
absolute Essence and matter itself refer to essence by virtue of being
essence. Now if that which is to be is a simple potentiality, it cannot
constitute "being," which consequently matter could not be.[289]
THE MONISM OF THE STOICS BREAKS DOWN, JUST LIKE DUALISM.
Consequently, the Stoics, who reproach other philosophers (such as
Plato) for making up beings out of non-beings,[290] themselves make up
a non-being out of a being.[291] Indeed (in the system of the Stoics),
the world, such as it is, is not being. It is certainly unreasonable
to insist that matter, which is a subject, should nevertheless be
"being," and that bodies should not, any more than matter be "being";
but it is still more unreasonable to insist that the world is "being,"
not by itself, but only by one of its parts (namely, matter); that the
organism does not owe its being to the soul, but only to matter; and
last, that the soul is only a modification of matter, and is something
posterior to others. From whom then did matter receive animation?
Whence comes the hypostatic existence of the soul? How does, matter
receive form? For, since matter becomes the bodies, the soul is
something else than matter. If the form came from something else than
the soul, quality, on uniting to matter, would produce not the soul,
but inanimate bodies. If something fashion matter and create the soul,
the created soul would have to be preceded by a "creating soul."
THE FAULT OF THE STOICS IS TO HAVE TAKEN SENSATION AS GUIDE.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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