Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
It might further be objected that if the same divisions which were
applied to essence were applied to unity, and if essence be a genus
because it divides itself, and manifests itself as the same in a
number of things, why then should unity also not be a genus, since it
appears in as many things as essence, and similarly divides itself?
Mere recurrence of something in several essences is no proof it is a
genus; whether in respect to the essences in which it occurs, or to
others. Merely being common to several essences by no means constitutes
a genus. No one will claim that a point is a genus for lines or for
anything else, though points be found in all lines. As said, unity
is found in every number, and nevertheless it is not a genus for
any number, or for anything else. The formation of a genus demands
that what is common to several things show specific differences,
constituting species, and be predicated of what exists. But what are
the specific differences within unity? What species does it form? If to
this it be answered that it forms the same species as essence, then it
blends with essence, and (unity) is (as said above), only another name
for essence; and essence, as category, suffices.
GENUINE RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITY AND ESSENCE.
11. The questions here to be solved are, how unity subsists within
essence, how they both divide, and in general how any genera divide;
and whether their two divisions be identical, or different. To solve
these questions, we shall first have to ask how in general any thing
whatever is said to be one, and is one; then, if it can be said in the
same sense that essence is one, in what sense this is said. Evidently,
unity is not the same for everything. It cannot even be understood in
the same sense in respect to sense-things, and intelligible things; not
any more than essence is identical for these two order of (beings),
or even for sense-things compared to each other. The idea of unity is
not the same in reference to a choric ballet, an army, a vessel or a
house; it is even less so in respect of one of these things, and when
it deals with continuous objects. And nevertheless, by their unity all
these things imitate the same archetype, some from far, some from near.
Intelligence, surely, is assuredly that which most approaches absolute
Unity; for although the soul already possess unity, Intelligence
possesses it far more intensely; for it is the one essence.
UNITY REIGNS STILL MORE IN THE GOOD.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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