Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
If you insist that the Good must be genus, we will grant it, as a
posterior genus; for it will be posterior to being. Now the existence
of (the Aristotelian) "essence,"[321] although it be always united to
Essence, is the Good itself; while the primary genera belong to Essence
for its own sake, and form "being." Hence we start to rise up to the
absolute Good, which is superior to Essence; for it is impossible for
essence and "being" not to be manifold; essence necessarily includes
the above-enumerated primary genera; it is the manifold unity.
IF THE EXCLUSIVE GOOD MEAN UNITY, A NEW GENUS WOULD BE UNNECESSARY.
But if by Good we here mean the unity which lies in Essence, we would
not hesitate to acknowledge that the actualization by which Essence
aspires to Unity is its true good, and that that is the means by
which it receives the form of Good. Then the good of Essence is the
actualization by which it aspires to the Good; that act constitutes its
life; now this actualization is a movement, and we have already ranked
movement among the primary genera. (It is therefore useless to make a
new genus of "Good conceived as unity").
BEAUTY IS TREATED SIMILARLY TO THE GOOD.
18. As to the beautiful, if that be taken to mean the primary and
supreme Beauty, we would answer as about the Good, or at least, we
would make an analogous answer. If however we mean only the splendor
with which the Idea shines, it may be answered that that splendor
is not the same everywhere; and that, besides, it is something
posterior.[322] If the beautiful be considered as absolute Being, it
is then already comprised with the "Being" already considered (and
consequently does not form a separate genus[323]). If it be considered
in respect to us human beings, who are spectators, and if it be
explained as producing in us a certain emotion, such an actualization
is a movement; but if, on the contrary, it be explained as that
tendency which draws us to the beautiful, this still is a movement.
KNOWLEDGE IS EITHER A MOVEMENT OR SOMETHING COMPOSITE.
Knowledge is pre-eminently movement; for it is the intuition of
essence; it is an actualization, and not a simple habit. It should,
therefore, also be reduced to movement.[299] It may also be reduced to
stability (if considered as a durable actualization); or rather, it
belongs to both genera. But if it belong to two different genera, it is
something of a blend; but anything blended is necessarily posterior (to
the elements which enter into the blend, and it cannot therefore either
be a primary genus).
INTELLIGENCE, JUSTICE, VIRTUES AND TEMPERANCE ARE NO GENERA.
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