Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
What sort of differences, indeed, might we use to establish such
divisions, and from what genus would we draw them? It seems absurd to
classify quality by quality itself. This is just as if the difference
of "beings" were to be called "beings." By what indeed could one
distinguish white from black, and colors from tastes and sensations
of touch? If we distinguish the difference of these qualities by the
sense-organs, these differences would no longer exist in the subjects.
How indeed could one and the same sense distinguish the difference of
the qualities it perceives? Is it because certain things exercise an
action that is constructive or destructive on the eyes, or the tongue?
We would then have to ask what is the constructive or destructive
element in the sensations thus excited? Yet, even were this answered,
such an answer would not explain wherein these things differ.[407]
DIFFERENCE IN EFFECTS IS LIMITED TO THE INTELLIGIBLES.
A further possibility is that these things should be classified
according to their effects, and that it is reasonable to do so with
invisible entities, such as sciences; but this would not be applicable
to sense-objects. When indeed we divide sciences by their effects, and
when, in general, we classify them according to the powers of the soul,
by concluding from the diversity of their effects that they differ,
our mind grasps the difference of these powers, and it determines not
only with what objects they deal, but it also defines their reason (or,
essence). Let us admit that it is easy to distinguish arts according
to their reasons, and according to the notions they include; but is it
possible to divide corporeal qualities in that manner? Even when one
studies the intelligible world, there is room for doubt as to how the
different reasons distinguish themselves from each other; it is easy
enough to see that white differs from black; but in what does it do so?
IT IS ABSURD TO DISTINGUISH BEING, QUALITIES AND DIFFERENCES BY
THEMSELVES.
18. All the questions we have asked show that we doubtless must
seek to discover the differences of the various (beings), so as to
distinguish them from each other; but that it is as impossible as it
is unreasonable to inquire what are the differences of the differences
themselves.[408] Being of beings, quantities of quantities, qualities
of qualities, differences of differences cannot be discovered; but we
should, wherever possible, classify exterior objects, either according
to their effects, or according to salient characteristics. When this is
impossible, objects should be distinguished, as for instance dark from
light green.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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