Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
"Always" must therefore be applied to the power which contains no
interval in its existence, which has need of nothing outside of what
it possesses, because it possesses everything, because it is every
being, and thus lacks nothing. Such a nature could not be complete
in one respect, but incomplete in another. Even if what is in time
should appear complete, as a body that suffices the soul appears
complete, though it be complete only for the soul; that which is in
time needs the future, and consequently is incomplete in respect to
the time it stands in need of; when it succeeds in enjoying the time
to which it aspires, and succeeds in becoming united thereto, even
though it still remain imperfect it still is called perfect by verbal
similarity. But the existence whose characteristic it is not to need
the future, not to be related to any other time--whether capable
of being measured, or indefinite, and still to be indefinite--the
existence that already possesses all it should possess is the very
existence that our intelligence seeks out; it does not derive its
existence from any particular quality, but exists before any quantity.
As it is not any kind of quantity, it could not admit within itself
any kind of quantity. Otherwise, as its life would be divided, it
would itself cease to be absolutely indivisible; but existence must
be as indivisible in its life as in its nature ("being"). (Plato's
expression,[446]) "the Creator was good" does indeed refer to the
notion of the universe, and indicates that, in the Principle superior
to the universe, nothing began to exist at any particular time. Never,
therefore, did the universe begin to exist within time, because though
its Author existed "before" it, it was only in the sense that its
author was the cause of its existence. But, after having used the word
"was," to express this thought, Plato immediately corrects himself,
and he demonstrates that this word does not apply to the Things that
possess eternity.
TO STUDY TIME WE HAVE TO DESCEND FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
6. (7). Speaking thus of eternity, it is not anything foreign to us,
and we do not need to consult the testimony of anybody but ourselves.
For indeed, how could we understand anything that we could not
perceive? How could we perceive something that would be foreign to us?
We ourselves, therefore, must participate in eternity. But how can we
do so, since we are in time? To understand how one can simultaneously
be in time and in eternity, it will be necessary to study time. We
must therefore descend from eternity to study time. To find eternity,
we have been obliged to rise to the intelligible world; now we are
obliged to descend therefrom to treat of time; not indeed descending
therefrom entirely, but only so far as time itself descended therefrom.
B. TIME.
THE OPINIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS ABOUT TIME MUST BE STUDIED.
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