Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
2. The virtues of the man who tries to rise to contemplation consist in
detaching oneself from things here below; that is why they are called
"purifications."[323] They command us to abstain from activities which
innervate the organs, and which excite the affections that relate to
the body. The object of these virtues is to raise the soul to genuine
existence. While the civil virtues are the ornament of mortal life,
and prepare the soul for the purificatory virtues, the latter direct
the man whom they adorn to abstain from activities in which the body
predominates. Thus, in the purificatory virtues, "prudence consists
in not forming opinions in harmony with the body, but in acting by
oneself, which is the work of pure thought. Temperance consists in not
sharing the passions of the body; courage, in not fearing separation
therefrom, as if death drove man into emptiness and annihilation; while
justice exacts that reason and intelligence command and be obeyed."
The civil virtues moderate the passions; their object is to teach us
to live in conformity with the laws of human nature. The contemplative
virtues obliterate the passions from the soul; their object is to
assimilate man to the divinity.
There is a difference between purifying oneself, and being pure.
Consequently the purificatory virtues may, like purification itself,
be considered in two lights; they purify the soul, and they adorn the
purified soul, because the object of purification is purity. But "since
purification and purity consist in being separated from every foreign
entity, the good is something different from the soul that purifies
itself. If the soul that purifies herself had possessed the good before
losing her purity, it would be sufficient for the soul to purify
herself; but in this very case, what would remain to her after the
purification would be the good, but not the purification. But the soul
is not the good; she can only participate therein, and have its form;
otherwise the soul would not have fallen into evil. For the soul, good
consists in being united to her author, and her evil is to unite with
lower things."[324]
Of evil, there are two kinds; the one, is to unite with lower things;
the other is to abandon oneself to the passions. The civil virtues
owe their name of virtues and their value to their releasing the soul
from one of these two kinds of evil (of the passions). The purificatory
virtues are superior to the former, in that they free the soul from
her characteristic form of evil (that is, union with lower things).
Therefore, when the soul is pure, she must be united to her author; her
virtue, after her "conversion," consists in her knowledge and science
of veritable existence; not that the soul lacks this knowledge, but
because without her superior principle, without intelligence, she does
not see what she possesses.[325]
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