[268] Plotinos here makes in the world-Soul a distinction analogous to that obtaining in the human one (where there is a reasonable soul, and its image, the vegetative soul, see i. 1.8-12; iv. 4. 13, 14). Here he asserts that there are two souls; the superior soul (the principal power of the soul, which receives the forms from Intelligence (see iv. 4.9-12, 35), and the inferior soul (nature, or the generative power), which transmits them to matter, so as to fashion it by seminal reasons (see iii. 4.13, 14, 22, 27). Bouillet, no doubt remembering Plotinos's own earlier invectives against those who divided the world-soul (ii. 9.6), evidently directed against Amelius and the Numenian influence, which till then he had followed--tries to minimize it, claiming that this does not mean two different hypostases, but only two functions of one and the same hypostasis. But he acknowledges that this gave the foundation for Plotinos's successors' distinction between the supermundane and the mundane souls (hyperkosmios, and egkosmios). Plotinos was therefore returning to Numenius's two world-souls (fr. 16), which was a necessary logical consequence of his belief in two human souls (fr. 53), as he himself had taught in iii. 8.5. Plotinos objectifies this doubleness of the soul in the myth of the two Hercules, in the next book, i. 1.12. [269] See ii. 9.2. [270] The subject announced in the preceding book, ii. 3.16; another proof of the chronological order. This is a very obscure book, depending on iv. 3 and 4: and vi. 7; on the theory of the three divine hypostases, on his psychology, the soul's relation to, and separation from the body, and metempsychosis. His doctrines of "self" and of the emotions are strikingly modern. [271] See sect. 2. [272] See sect. 3. [273] See sect. 4. [274] See sect. 7, 11. [275] This most direct translation of "pathos," is defective in that it means rather an experience, a passive state, or modification of the soul. It is a Stoic term. [276] "Dianoia" is derived from "dia nou," and indicates that the discursive thought is exercised "by means of the intelligence," receiving its notions, and developing them by ratiocination, see v. 3.3. It is the actualization of discursive reason "to dianoêtikon," or of the reasonable soul ("psychê logikê"), which conceives, judges, and reasons (dianoei, krínei, logizetai). [277] "Noêsis" means intuitive thought, the actualization of intelligence. [278] See sect. 7. [279] See Porphyry, Faculties of the Soul, and Ficinus, commentary on this book. [280] In Greek, "to zoon," "to syntheton," "to synamphoteron," "to koinon," "to eidôlon." [281] See i. 2.5. [282] According to the Stoics. [283] According to Alexander of Aphrodisia. [284] As thought Aristotle, de Anima 2.1; see 4.3.21, and Numenius, 32. [285] A famous comparison, found in Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1; Plato, Laws, x. p. 906; Cary, 14; and especially Numenius, 32. [286] As Plotinos thinks. [287] iv. 4.20. [288] iv. 3.20.