Elsewhere[190] it is objected that matter does not exist; here the attempt is to show that matter is not evil in so far as it exists. (If this were the case), we should not seek the origin of evil outside of the soul, but it would be located within the soul herself; there evil consists in the absence of good. But, evidently, the soul would have nothing good on the hypothesis that privation of form is an accident of the being, which desires to receive form; that, consequently, the privation of good is an accident of the soul; and that the latter produces within herself wickedness by her ("seminal) reason." Another result would be that the soul would have no life, and be inanimate; which would lead to the absurdity that the soul is no soul. THE SOUL CANNOT POSSESS EVIL WITHIN HERSELF. We are thus forced to assert, that the soul possesses life by virtue of her ("seminal) reason," so that she does not, by herself, possess privation of good. Then she must from intelligence derive a trace of good, and have the form of good. The soul, therefore, cannot by herself be evil. Consequently, she is not the first Evil, nor does she contain it as an accident, since she is not absolutely deprived of good. RELATIVE PRIVATION IS IMPOSSIBLE. 12. To the objection that in the soul wickedness and evil are not an absolute privation, but only a relative privation of good, it may be answered that in this case, if the soul simultaneously, contain possession and privation of the good, she will have possessed a feeling mingled of good and evil, and not of unmingled evil. We will still not have found the first evil, the absolute Evil. The good of the soul will reside in her essence (being); evil will only be an accident thereof. EVIL AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE SOUL.