Plutarch's essays and miscellanies, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Comprising all his works collected under the title of "Morals"Plutarch
Philosophy
Plutarch's essays and miscellanies, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Comprising all his works collected under the title of "Morals"
Plutarch
Classical literature; Essays; Ethics; Philosophy
God neither incorporated
that which is incorporeal, nor conveyed a soul into that which had
none before; like a person either musical or poetical, who does not
make either the voice or the movement, but only reduces the voice with
harmony, and graces the movement with proper measures. Thus God did not
make the tangible and resistant solidity of the corporeal substance,
nor the imaginative or moving faculties of the soul; but taking these
two principles as they lay ready at hand,—the one obscure and dark, the
other turbulent and senseless, both imperfect without the bounds of
order and decency,—he disposed, digested, and embellished the confused
mass, so that he brought to perfection a most absolute and glorious
creature. Therefore the substance of the body is no other than that
all-receiving Nature, the seat and nurse of all created beings.
6. But the substance of the soul, in Philebus, he called an infinite
being, the privation of number and proportion; having neither
period nor measure either of diminution or excess or distinction or
dissimilitude. But as to that order which he alleges in Timaeus to
be the mixture of nature with the indivisible substance, but which
being applied to bodies becomes liable to division,—he would not have
it thought to be a bulk made up by units or points, nor longitude
and breadth, which are qualities more consentaneous to bodies
than to the soul, but that disorderly unlimited principle, moving
both itself and other substances, that which he frequently calls
necessity, and which within his treatise of laws he openly styles
the disorderly, ill-acting, or harm-doing soul. For such was this
soul of herself; but at length she came to partake of understanding,
ratiocination, and harmony, that she might be the soul of the world.
Now that all-receiving principle of matter enjoyed both magnitude,
space, and distance; but beauty, form, and measure of proportion it
had none. However, all these it obtained, to the end that, when it
came to be thus embellished and adorned, it might assume the form
of all the various bodies and organs of the earth, the sea, the
heavens, the stars, and of all those infinite varieties of plants
and living creatures. Now as for those who attribute to this matter,
and not to the soul, that which in Timaeus is called necessity, in
Philebus vast disproportion and unlimited exorbitancy of diminution
and excess,—they can never maintain it to be the cause of disorder,
since Plato always alleges that same matter to be without any form or
figures, and altogether destitute of any quality or effectual virtue
properly belonging to it; comparing it to such oils as have no scent
at all, which the perfumers mix in their tinctures. For there is no
likelihood that Plato would suppose that to be the cause and principle
of evil which is altogether void of quality in itself, sluggish, and
never to be roused on to action, and yet at the same time brand this
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