Greece -- Biography -- Early works to 1800; Rome -- Biography -- Early works to 1800
If, however, we place the chief glory of a general in feats of arms
and strategy, the Laconian will be found greatly to excel the Roman.
Agesilaus did not abandon Sparta even when it was attacked by seventy
thousand men, when he had but few troops with which to defend it, and
those too all disheartened by their recent defeat at Leuktra.
Pompeius, on hearing that Cæsar, with only five thousand three hundred
men, had taken a town in Italy, left Rome in terror, either yielding
to this small force like a coward, or else falsely supposing it to be
more numerous than it was. He carefully carried off his own wife and
children, but left the families of his partizans unprotected in Rome,
when he ought either to have fought for the city against Cæsar, or
else to have acknowledged him as his superior and submitted to him,
for Cæsar was both his fellow-countryman and his relative. Yet, after
having violently objected to the prorogation of Cæsar's term of office
as consul, he put it in his power to capture Rome itself, and to say
to Metellus that he regarded him and all the rest of the citizens as
prisoners of war.
IV. Agesilaus, when he was the stronger, always forced his enemy to
fight, and when weaker, always avoided a battle. By always practising
this, the highest art of a general, he passed through his life without
a single defeat; whereas Pompeius was unable to make use of his
superiority to Cæsar by sea, and was forced by him to hazard
everything on the event of a land battle; for as soon as Cæsar had
defeated him, he at once obtained possession of all Pompeius's
treasure, supplies, and command of the sea, without gaining which he
must inevitably have been defeated, even without a battle. Pompeius's
excuse for his conduct is, in truth, his severest condemnation. It is
very natural and pardonable for a young general to be influenced by
clamours and accusations of remissness and cowardice, so as to abandon
the course which he had previously decided upon as the safest; but
that the great Pompeius, of whom the Romans used to say that the camp
was his home, and that he only made an occasional campaign in the
senate house, at a time when his followers called the consuls and
generals of Rome traitors and rebels, and when they knew that he was
in possession of absolute uncontrolled power, and had already
conducted so many campaigns with such brilliant success as
commander-in-chief--that he should be moved by the scoffs of a
Favonius or a Domitius, and hazard his army and his life lest they
should call him Agamemnon, is a most discreditable supposition. If he
were so sensitive on the point of honour, he ought to have made a
stand at the very beginning, and fought a battle in defence of Rome,
not first to have retreated, giving out that he was acting with a
subtlety worthy of Themistokles himself, and then to have regarded
every day spent in Thessaly without fighting as a disgrace. The plain
of Pharsalia was not specially appointed by heaven as the arena in
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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