we believe,[194] a compromise between central autocratic deterrence and tribal ‘private vengeance.’ In the last clause of the Demosthenic passage which we have cited there is a reference to the righteousness of slaying a murderer if he did not abstain from the ‘land’ of the victim where that ‘land’ or State was different from his own. We fail to understand how such a law could have existed, or could have effectively operated, without an international compact expressly made or tacitly adopted through the mouthpiece of an Amphictyonic oracle. We cannot accept Glotz’s theory[195] that the immunity of homicide exiles abroad originated in separate treaties of Refuge or ἀσυλία. The law is much too wide and universal to permit of such an explanation. Thus, for instance, if an Athenian slew a Theban at Athens or at Thebes, the murderer was bound, after conviction, to abstain from Athens and Thebes for the rest of his life. No single Greek state could have produced such a law. Such eventualities would inevitably require an international compact or an Amphictyonic sanction. Plato confirms the existence of these laws. Speaking of involuntary homicide, he says[196]: ‘It is necessary that the slayer should withdraw from the (country of the) slain and evacuate his own native land for a year: if the deceased is a stranger, let the homicide be debarred from the stranger’s “land” for the same period.’ Speaking of wilful murderers, he says[197]: ‘If he goes abroad without challenging a verdict (μὴ θέλησας κρίσιν ὑποσχεῖν), let him suffer perpetual exile: but if any such person sets foot upon the “land” of the slain, let whoever first meets him, whether relative (of slain) or citizen, slay him with impunity, or ... hand him to the magistrates ... to put him to death.’