Müller says[271]: ‘When a verdict of manslaughter was returned it was allowable for the prosecutor and the accused to enter into a compromise on the spot, if they pleased.’ He admits, however, that ‘in the regular mode of procedure, the convict quitted his country by a certain road and at a certain time and remained absent’ until he ‘appeased’ the relatives of the slain, ‘whereupon he was permitted to return home under certain prescribed forms, and, after the due performance of sacrifices and rites of purification, he was at liberty to dwell once more in his native land.’ The question of the ‘appeasement’ of relatives after exile in cases of involuntary homicide will come up for discussion later.[272] At present we are speaking of ‘compromise,’ or of ‘private settlement,’ without exile: we may note Müller’s admission as to the ‘regular mode of procedure.’ He cites no authority for his statement about a ‘compromise.’ Plato uniformly insists that a period of exile was always compulsory in cases of involuntary homicide.[273] ‘Forgiveness’ on the part of the ‘dying’—as distinct from ‘release,’ which Plato has not in mind[274]—always reduced the charge to one of manslaughter. Hence we have argued that ‘release’ abolished all guilt and pollution. Speaking of ‘forgiveness’ Plato says[275]: ‘If any person of his own accord gives an absolution (ἄφεσις) to anyone for such a deed let the purgations take place for the slayer as if the act had been involuntary and let there be a period of one year in exile according to law (ἐν νόμῳ).’ Speaking of general cases of manslaughter, he says[276]: ‘If anyone kills involuntarily a freeborn person, let him be purified with the same purgations as he who has killed a slave and let him not dishonour a certain ancient legend ... hence the slayer must withdraw (into exile) ... for all the seasons of a single year.’ The legend which Plato mentions is suggestive: ‘A freeman slain by violence was,’ he says, ‘angry with his murderer while his death was still recent ... and seeing his slayer roaming about in the places which he himself frequented (when alive) shuddered at the thought and, sore distressed, harasses with all his might the slayer and his movements, using memory as an ally in the task.’ Here we can plainly detect that minor local ‘pollution’ which was caused by the temporary resentment of the slain, and such ‘pollution’ could only be removed by a period of exile. There is a difference, then, between ‘release’ and ‘forgiveness.’ In the latter case the slayer was still ‘polluted’: the ghost has absorbed the anger of the gods which is caused by the shedding of blood. Hence we think that the relatives were not free, in such a case, to ‘compound’ with the slayer except at the risk of incurring the anger of the dead and of the gods. We agree with Müller’s statement regarding Plato[277]—namely, that his ‘scheme of criminal law is in the main based on the same principles as the Attic