In the case of objects which could only have proved fatal if they were thrown by a human agent, a verdict of acquittal, in regard to such objects, would have logically involved a verdict of murder by persons unknown; for, if we suppose that the object was accidentally thrown, it is probable that the thrower would have come forward and established the blood-guilt of the object concurrently with his own innocence. Demosthenes[48] says in regard to the Prytaneum court: ‘If a stone or piece of wood or iron or anything of the kind falls upon and strikes a man and we are ignorant who it was that threw it, but know and have in our possession the instrument of death, proceedings are taken against such instruments here.’ Plato asserts that the objects mentioned were prosecuted by the relatives of the slain: but may we not also assume that a man who had thrown one of these objects without malicious intent, and who was accused of murder or manslaughter, would have lodged an accusation against the ‘object’ at the preliminary inquiry[49] before the King-Archon, that is, at the Prytaneum? If the Prytaneum found the object guilty, would not the verdict have prohibited any further proceedings? If, on the other hand, the object was clearly hurled by a human agent with malicious intent, and if the agent was unknown, proceedings, of a most formal kind, were taken against the unknown slayer. Similar proceedings would of course be taken if there was no ‘object’ involved, as, for instance, in case of death by strangling. Such proceedings are thus described by Plato[50]: ‘If anyone,’ he says, ‘is found dead and the murderer is not known, and is not discovered by careful search-parties, let there be proclamation against the murderer as in other cases, and let the heir-at-law (_i.e._ the nearest relative of the deceased) proclaim in the market-place that the murderer, whoever he is, must not, since he is guilty of bloodshed, set foot in any sacred place in his native State or in that of his victim, or if he does, and he is discovered and identified, he shall be put to death and cast unburied beyond the boundaries.’ We have already pointed out[51] that the object and purpose of trials for homicide in Greece was not so much the establishment of guilt, as it is in modern States, but rather the establishment of innocence. Now, our last quotation from Plato suggests that a man who came to be suspected of homicide some time after the crime was committed, and who was never formally prosecuted and convicted, could, nevertheless, be put to death! But we shall see[52] that one refuge still remained to the ‘unfortunate wretch.’ He could have pleaded innocence, in the presence of the avengers, and this plea compelled _ipso facto_ a recourse to trial: he could of course be arrested on the spot and imprisoned, but he could challenge a verdict at a court of summary jurisdiction, the prison court, known as ‘the Eleven,’[53] and if he