expected, Glotz[65] and Müller[66] interpret this Demosthenic reference as if it were a logical scientific document: and they accept the _prima facie_ inference that a person accused of manslaughter could, as soon as he was publicly proclaimed and banned from all public and religious intercourse, avoid the ordeal of a trial and the punishment of exile by simply taking some money with him to the house of the father, brother and sons of deceased; if he succeeded in securing a ‘settlement’ and procured a ‘legal release,’ he could have quietly resumed his ordinary occupations! This interpretation, which we have already rejected,[67] is inconsistent with other passages in Demosthenes and in Plato which we shall now discuss. While we admit that this law of Dracon does not, unfortunately, mention the exile penalty for manslaughter as an obvious and incontrovertible fact, yet we insist that it does mention trial as a normal concomitant. The Ephetae are there, first and last. The Ephetae must decide the degree of guilt: they must decide that the slayer slew involuntarily: they must in the absence of relatives or in the event of their disagreement select the ‘phrateres’ according to birth or merit. This at least is very different from ‘private settlement.’ Demosthenes[68] quotes another law of Dracon regarding manslaughter, as follows: ‘If anyone shall pursue or plunder beyond the civic boundary any of those slayers who have gone into exile and whose property is not confiscate to the State, he shall incur the same penalty as if he did so inside our boundaries’ (ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ). Fortunately we possess Demosthenes’ explanation of this law which, because of its peculiar expression, requires some such explanation. The word ἐπίτιμα, in reference to property, is opposed to ἄτιμα and means ‘not confiscated.’ Hence, the phrase ‘Slayers whose property is not confiscated’ must refer, says the orator, to ‘involuntary slayers,’ because the property of wilful murderers is confiscated to the State. Thus this Draconian law, instead of employing the adjective ‘involuntary’ (ἀκούσιος) as a predicate of ‘slayers,’ uses two clauses to describe what a single adjective would have described. Are these two clauses, then, to be regarded as definitive; as concerned with qualities which normally and universally characterised involuntary slayers? Are involuntary homicides, as a class, defined as ‘those manslayers who have gone into exile and whose property is State-guaranteed’ (ἐπίτιμα)? Or are we rather to suppose that there were two classes of involuntary homicides, and that this law refers to only one of these classes—that in some cases, as Glotz and Müller conceive the matter, the slayer bribed the relatives of the slain, and avoided all further trouble; and, in other cases, he went into exile? In our opinion this quotation suggests that all involuntary slayers went into exile for a period of time. Müller holds[69] that the duration of