the “appeasement” and their return home from exile: and let them abide by the decisions of these magistrates; and if, after returning from exile, anyone of these commits again the same offence, let him be exiled and never return: if he returns let him suffer in the same way as if a stranger returns’ (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ξένου ἄφιξιν). Here we have a very different picture from that which the theories of Glotz and Müller and some Demosthenic passages suggest. There is question of manslaughter, but there is no reference to the power of wrangling relatives to prevent the exile’s return. On the contrary, it is stated that the ‘appeasement’ was controlled by judges who may have been _phrateres_, but were probably not kinsmen of the slayer. The last line in the passage refers to a law which we have already[74] mentioned, namely that which decreed perpetual exile for manslaughter committed between strangers in any given State. The penalty for ‘returning’ in such a case, that is, for _rupture de ban_, was death. In a passage which refers to a case of kin-slaying, in which the dying man ‘forgave’ his slayer (without, however, granting a ‘release’), Plato says[75]: ‘If any person of his own accord absolves anyone for such a deed, let the purgations be made for the slayer as if his act had been involuntary, and let one year be the term of his absence from the country according to law.’ The theory of the legality of ‘private settlement,’ before or after trial, cannot be reconciled with this quotation. The phrase ‘according to law’ suggests that Plato refers to actual Attic law, and not to an ideal law of his own creation. Plato adds that in such a case the slayer can never resume his ordinary domestic life, even though he recovers his civic status. Similarly, for the slaying in a passion of a husband by his wife, or of a wife by her husband, the penalty prescribed is three years’ exile, but such persons, even though not akin in blood, cannot return home to share in common domestic rites with their children, or to eat at the same table. In this law we see clearly the operation of a local or domestic ‘pollution’ which debars the slayer from his family hearth, and which is quite distinct from the civic pollution which debars him from certain definite States. It is important to observe that with the local or domestic pollution no civic or international law has ever interfered; whereas civic pollution has been regulated by law according to the varying degrees of guilt, and the claims of the relatives to ‘appeasement.’ Plato implies that one year was the normal period of exile for manslaughter. The Greek verbs ἀπενιαυτίζειν[76] and ἀπενιαυτεῖν convey the same implication. Can this fact be reconciled with the law of Dracon? We believe that it can, but only by distinguishing between theory and practice, between local and central courts, between local and central religion.