Justifiable homicide of the second class has close affinities with extenuated manslaughter, or slaying in a passion. The essential difference lies in an express legal justification in one case, and the absence of such a justification in the other. When we come to analyse the Oresteian legends of Attic tragedy we shall find[84] that the close affinity which exists between these two legal conceptions caused considerable confusion in the legends—caused Orestes to be immune from punishment, from one standpoint, but liable to a period of exile, from another. The oracle of Apollo, which commanded him to slay his mother, should naturally have been accepted as a complete justification. Some legends took this view.[85] But such a contingency was not expressly mentioned in the Attic laws concerning justifiable homicide. Plato assures us[86] that under no circumstances, not even in self-defence, was it lawful to slay a parent. Hence it became necessary to regard Apollo as the divinely immune cause of guilt; and Orestes, as his blind, obedient instrument, became liable to a merely nominal charge of manslaughter or extenuated matricide! His mother was almost compelled to ‘forgive’ the deed! In one legend[87] Apollo commanded the Erinnyes to withdraw from pursuit, and drove them from his temple; in another he decreed that they should pursue Orestes for a year![88] Our third classification includes cases in which only two issues could be raised—namely, lawful homicide or wilful murder. From this point of view the act of Orestes could also be discussed, and an Athenian court could find it interesting to discuss and difficult to decide at what precise time in the post-Homeric social evolution did private vengeance become illegal! The trial of Orestes at Argos, which Euripides describes in the _Orestes_, seems to depend upon this legal difficulty.[89] We will now illustrate these cases by relevant quotations. Aristotle’s[90] account is a mere extract, or rather a kind of summary: ‘Homicide,’ he says, ‘admitted and alleged to be lawful, as of an adulterer caught in the act, or of a friend mistaken for an enemy in war, or of an antagonist in an athletic contest, is tried in the Delphinium.’ The first clause has been included in our second classification, the rest of the cases belong to our first category. Demosthenes quotes[91] the Draconian laws, and his account is almost identical with that which Plato[92] gives. To facilitate comparison, we will quote both accounts together in parallel columns: _Demosthenes_