perpetual exile.’ Demosthenes[111] implies that the last moment at which the murderer could flee was ‘after the first speech’ at the trial.[112] Pollux[113] clearly means to say the same thing, though the omission of the tiny negative μή has annoyed the commentators.[114] ‘The Areopagus,’ he says, ‘judged cases of slaying and wounding with intent (to kill) and arson (with intent to kill?) and (the administering of) drugs if one intends to kill in administering (them).’ So far his words are identical with those of the ‘Draconian’ law, as it is given by Demosthenes. He continues: ‘There took place a preliminary oath (διωμοσία), and after this the trial ... and after the first speech it was lawful (for the defendant) to go into exile if anyone had slain his parents’ (εἴ τις γονέας εἴη ἀπεκτονώς). When we discuss presently[115] the Attic law of parricide and kin-slaying, it will perhaps be more obvious that Pollux must have written εἰ μή τις γονέας εἴη ἀπεκτονώς, ‘_unless_ a man had slain his parents.’ The ‘Draconian’ law concerning the Areopagus will be discussed later, in our chapter on the Attic murder courts. We need not enter into the details of the preliminary accusations, the investigation before the Archon Basileus, and the three monthly trials which preceded the final trial and the verdict. Such details, if not already referred to, may be found in all the ordinary books of reference.[116] But there is one question which merits a brief examination at this stage: namely, the question whether the death penalty, in cases of wilful murder, cancelled or obviated the confiscation of the murderer’s property to the State.