Plato describes, in hideous detail, the execution by public magistrates of the slayer of a kinsman.[212] Even for malicious wounding within the family, the penalty of death is decreed.[213] For wounding in a passion, a fine could be imposed by the parent or the male kindred of the offender: but if a parent was wounded by his child, death could be inflicted, even by a tribal court, in which none of the relatives of the child could act as judges.[214] Lysias[215] makes one of his pleaders repudiate, most emphatically, the suggestion that parricide was not criminal and illegal. The word ἀνδροφόνος, or homicide, includes, he says, implicitly if not explicitly, the slayer of a parent. Pollux,[216] however he be interpreted, must be regarded as implying that parricide was a crime, which was probably punished by the Areopagus. We have quoted the relevant passage already.[217] Pollux is describing the Areopagus, which was the admittedly regular court for wilful murder. He refers to the preliminary affidavits, and, speaking of the final trial, is represented by the text of Dindorf as saying ‘After the first speech it is lawful to go into exile—if one has slain one’s parents’! Now, if we suppose that this text is correct, it would follow that parricide was a State offence which was judged by the Areopagus State court. But the same conclusion can be maintained even if, as we believe, the text is incorrect. We believe that Pollux wrote not εἰ but εἰ μὴ, and that he means ‘unless one slays one’s parents.’ He clearly implies that parricide also came before the Areopagus. Finally, the _Euthyphro_ of Plato, which represents a man actually bringing an indictment or a charge of murder against his father, cannot be explained on the assumptions of Glotz and Caillemer. The weakness of Euthyphro’s legal position is pointed out by Socrates,[218] namely that Euthyphro was not a kinsman of the slain. The threatened indictment was a δίκη, not a γραφὴ. It was a regular charge of homicide which was lodged with the Archon Basileus.[219] Now Socrates’ objection would not apply if the slain man had been a kinsman of the accuser: and this would necessarily have been the case if the father of Euthyphro had slain a member of his own family or kindred.