In 1916 with prices ranging from $15 to $93.50 per unit, the United States produced 5,969 tons of concentrates; in 1917 while still under the impetus of the 1916 boom, with prices ranging around $25 per unit, 6,144 tons; and in 1918, with prices still averaging about $25 per unit, 5,041 tons, although little was produced in December. Under a price of $17 per unit, which tariff advocates think can be reached by means of a tariff of $10 per unit, it seems improbable that the United States can depend on a production of more than 3,000 tons per annum for the next three years. There are, of course, possibilities of a larger production and there are equal possibilities of a smaller. Should another great war take place, an event that is not beyond the range of imagination, the United States would probably begin by using tungsten at the rate of 20,000 tons of concentrates per annum. Unless the price were even more extravagant than the highest price in 1916, $93.50 per unit, the United States could not produce half of its needed concentrates, and the time required to reach even that output would be far too long for safety. Of course, such a production would be much better than none, but the United States should, for safety, have within reach at least a year’s supply. The Pacific, around the borders of which are the largest tungsten deposits, is by many looked upon as the next large theatre of war, and however vitally they were needed, the obtaining of supplies of tungsten ores might become impossible though the blocking of trade routes. It would, therefore, seem vastly better that, instead of putting a premium on the quick depletion of our own supplies, which are already too meager, we should use the rich low-priced ores now being mined in the Orient. These cheap ores we may have in trade for the asking, and it would be one of the best forms of national life insurance for the government to store 10,000 tons of these ores while they may be had.