Another question concerning vision, which has very much perplexed philosophers, is this; how comes it that we see objects erect, when it is well known that their images or pictures on the retina are inverted? The sagacious Kepler, who first made this discovery, was the first that endeavoured to explain the cause of it. The reason he gives for our seeing objects erect, is this, that as the rays from different points of an object cross each other before they fall on the retina, we conclude that the impulse we feel upon the lower part of the retina comes from above; and that the impulse we feel from the higher part, comes from below. Des Cartes afterwards gave the same solution of this phenomenon, and illustrated it by the judgment we form of the position of objects which we feel with our arms crossed, or with two sticks that cross each other. But this solution is by no means satisfactory: first, because it supposes our seeing objects erect to be a deduction from reason, drawn from certain premises, whereas it seems to be an immediate perception; and secondly, because all the premises from which this conclusion is supposed to be drawn, are absolutely unknown to far the greater part of mankind, and yet they all see objects erect. Bishop Berkeley, who justly rejects this solution, gives another, founded on his own principles, in which he is followed by Dr. Smith. This ingenious writer thinks that the ideas of sight are altogether unlike those of touch; and since the notions we have of an object by these different senses, have no similitude, we can learn only by experience how one sense will be affected, by what, in a certain manner, affects the other. Thus, finding from experience, that an object in an erect position, affects the eye in one manner, and that the same object in an inverted position, affects it in another, we learn to judge, by the manner in which the eye is affected, whether the object is erect or inverted. But it is evident that Bishop Berkeley proceeds upon a capital mistake, in supposing that there is no resemblance between the extension, figure, and position, which we see, and that which we perceive by touch. It may be further observed, that Bishop Berkeley's system, with regard to material things, must have made him see this question, in a very different light from that in which it appears to those who do not adopt his system. In order to give a satisfactory answer to this question, we must first examine some of the laws of nature, which take place in vision; for by these the phenomena of vision must be regulated.