Popular misgovernment in the United StatesCruikshank, Alfred Byron
History
Popular misgovernment in the United States
Cruikshank, Alfred Byron
Suffrage -- United States; United States -- Politics and government
“Sales of monopolies in the use of public thoroughfares; systematic
jobbing of contracts; enormous abuses of patronage; enormous
overcharges for necessary public works. Cities have been compelled
to buy land for parks and places because the owners wished to sell
them; to grade, pave and sewer streets without inhabitants in order
to award corrupt contracts for the works; to purchase worthless
properties at extravagant prices; to abolish one office and create
another with the same duties, or to vary the functions of offices
for the sole purpose of redistributing official emoluments; to make
or keep the salary of an office unduly high in order that its
tenant may pay largely to the party funds; to lengthen the term of
office in order to secure the tenure of corrupt or incompetent men.
When increasing taxation begins to arouse resistance, loans are
launched under false pretences and often with the assistance of
falsified accounts. In all the chief towns municipal debts have
risen to colossal dimensions and increased with portentous
rapidity.” (Hyslop, _Democracy_, pp. 14, 15.)
This from another writer:
“No candid man can wonder at it. It is the plain, inevitable
consequence of the application of the method of extreme democracy
to municipal government. The elections are by manhood suffrage.
Only a small proportion of the electors have any appreciable
interest in moderate taxation and economical administration, and a
proportion of votes, which is usually quite sufficient to hold the
balance of power, is in the hands of recent and most ignorant
immigrants. Is it possible to conceive of conditions more fitted to
subserve the purposes of cunning and dishonest men, whose object is
personal gain, whose method is the organization of the vicious and
ignorant elements of the community into combinations that can turn
elections, levy taxes, and appoint administrators? The rings are so
skillfully constructed that they can nearly always exclude from
office a citizen who is known to be hostile; though a ‘good, easy
man, who will not fight, and will make a reputable figurehead, may
be an excellent investment.’ Sometimes, no doubt, the bosses
quarrel among themselves, and the cause of honest government may
gain something by the dispute. But in general, as long as
government is not absolutely intolerable, the more industrious and
respectable classes keep aloof from the nauseous atmosphere of
municipal politics, and decline the long, difficult, doubtful task
of entering into conflict with the dominant rings.”
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Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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