Popular misgovernment in the United StatesCruikshank, Alfred Byron
History
Popular misgovernment in the United States
Cruikshank, Alfred Byron
Suffrage -- United States; United States -- Politics and government
This system has the effect of strengthening party discipline; under it
every office holder is much more obligated to the party boss than to the
public. True, he apparently owes his election to the people; but usually
only apparently; since most of the votes he receives are strictly party
votes, representing merely the will and the direction of the boss and
the machine. But to the latter the candidate’s obligation is clear,
direct and personal; to them he owes his nomination, or at least the
suggestion of his name to the primaries which makes his election
possible; and if defeated at the polls, his future is still in their
friendly hands. The party leaders and managers being thus cared for, and
their faithful service forever secured by the distribution among them of
all the best public employments, guaranteed by the rotation system
developed into a “steady job insurance” scheme, there remain the
inferior county, city, town and village offices for apportionment among
the smaller fry, and to these minor places a real rotation system is
applied to a greater or less extent. It is often understood that a
sheriff, alderman, tax collector, police magistrate, town solicitor or
attorney, county clerk, town or village official, etc., must be
satisfied with one or two terms and then give place to some other more
hungry politician. This is the rotation system in practice.
The demoralizing results of such a custom are easy to be seen among us
and still more easily imagined. Many public office holders in view of
the probable brevity of their tenure, try to hold on at the same time to
both private business and public office, with the natural result that
both are neglected. Elections are expensive. An official owing last
election’s bills finds the next one approaching with marvellous
rapidity. From rigid enforcement of laws enemies might result, from whom
next year’s candidate need expect neither money nor support, but rather
opposition; and after all, one year in office is a paltry reward for a
faithful party man after many years of fruitless canvassing. And so
comes lax administration, blinking of the eyes and scandal more or less
smothered. And in this and other ways the character of the office holder
is impaired. The lure of this kind of politics is as demoralizing as
that of gambling. Thousands of individuals who uncorrupted by political
life might have remained honest and industrious citizens, are spoiled
for real steady work by their experience of easy living at the public
cost, and become half knavish and altogether poor business men, and
sometimes even debauched and intemperate. And if the office holder does
his very best it usually happens that just when he has learned his
duties and begins to perform them well, his term approaches its finish
and a greedy greenhorn takes his place.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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