“1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.... “2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers.... “3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter....”[794] The seizure of the steel mills by President Truman in face of a contrary congressional policy fell into the third of these categories and left presidential power “most vulnerable to attack and in the least favorable of possible constitutional postures.” The Court could sustain the President’s action “only by holding that seizure of such strike-bound industries is within his domain and beyond control by Congress.”[795] Also concurring, Mr. Justice Clark relied on the precedent of _Little_ v. _Barreme_.[796] Although “the Constitution does grant to the President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative emergency”[797] and in the absence of Congressional action “the President’s independent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the nation,”[798] the lesson of _Little_ v. _Barreme_ and sound constitutional exposition demand that “where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis....”[799] In his dissenting opinion Chief Justice Vinson maintained that the majority justices had each assumed the unarticulated major premise that the emergency was not of sufficient gravity to warrant the mode of action adopted by the President. The Chief Justice chided his colleagues for not weighing the magnitude of the emergency accurately.[800] But this seems hardly a warrantable criticism of a group of opinions which manifested little concern with substantive constitutional limitations upon executive emergency action, but rather emphasized the necessity for compliance with a congressional program anticipating such an emergency and prescribing the mode of response to it. THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1959 In 1959 the nation’s great steel industry once again occupied the center of a dispute which had far reaching consequences. The dispute was that between representatives of the twelve largest steel producers in the United States and representatives of the United Steelworkers of America, the union representing most of the non-supervisory employees employed in the steel industry.