The studies referred to include: Edward S. Corwin, _The President: Office and Powers_ (New York: New York University Press, 3rd ed., 1948); and _Total War and the Constitution_ (New York: Knopf, 1947); Clarence Berdahl, _War Powers of the Executive in the United States_, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1921); Clinton L. Rossiter, _Constitutional Dictatorship_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948) and _The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief_ (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951); Wilfred E. Binkley, _President and Congress_ (New York: Knopf, 1947); Bennett M. Rich, _The President and Civil Disorder_ (Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 1941); Louis W. Koenig, _The Presidency and the Crisis_ (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1944); John W. Burgess, Ch. XXVIII, vol. 2, _The Civil War and the Constitution_ (New York: Scribners, 1901); James Hart, _The Ordinance Making Powers of the President of the United States_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1925); James G. Randall, _Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln_, rev. ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951); and a recent article by Albert L. Sturm, “Emergencies and the President,” 11 _Journal of Politics_, 121, 1949, in which he says, “Lincoln’s precedents have afforded warrant for his aggressive successors to meet extraordinary needs with extraordinary remedies, despite their doubtful constitutionality.” Perhaps as broad a claim to an executive prerogative as has been made in the United States is that which Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., bases upon his study of _The Spending Power_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943): “There are certain circumstances which constitute a law of necessity and self-preservation and which render the _salus populi_ supreme over the written law. The officer who is called to act upon this superior ground does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the Constitution, but his station makes it his duty to incur that risk.” p. 12. [8] Edward S. Corwin strongly emphasizes that incident in his _The President: Office and Powers_ (New York: New York University Press, 3rd ed., 1948), pp. 303-6. [9] This is the doctrine which would seem to emerge from _Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer_, 343 U. S. 579 (1952), in which the Court rejected contentions on behalf of President Truman that he enjoyed an “inherent” emergency power to seize private industry in time of emergency occasioned by work stoppages. [10] This study should not be interpreted as an effort to catalog exhaustively _existing_ delegations of emergency powers to the President. Statutes of the era 1933 to 1955 are analyzed without regard to their present status as expired or in force. CHAPTER II