[399] _Id._, Sec. 5. [400] _Id._, Sec. 7 (a) (b). [401] _Id._, Sec. 7 (c). [402] 44 Stat. 577, May 20, 1926, Sec. 2; 48 Stat. 1185, June 21, 1934, Secs. 2-5. [403] 48 Stat. 933, June 12, 1934, Sec. 20. [404] 52 Stat. 973, June 23, 1938. [405] 64 Stat. 825, September 9, 1950, Sec. 1. [406] 48 Stat. 1064, June 19, 1934, Secs. 1-2. [407] _Id._, Sec. 606 (b). [408] _Id._ [409] 55 Stat. 610, July 30, 1941, Sec. 8 (a). [410] _Id._, Sec. 101 (e). [411] 67 Stat. 115, June 30, 1953. [412] 49 Stat. 1081, August 31, 1935, Sec. 3. [413] _Id._ [414] _Id._, Sec. 4. [415] 50 Stat. 3, January 18, 1937. [416] 50 Stat. 121, May 1, 1937, Secs. 2 (a), 6-7. [417] Proclamation No. 2236, 50 Stat. 1831, May 1, 1937. [418] 54 Stat. 4, November 4, 1939, Sec. 2 (c). [419] _Id._, Sec. 2 (a). Emphasis supplied. Note that the effect was to loosen the earlier prohibition upon export of arms to belligerents while simultaneously it more strictly circumscribed the movements of American vessels. [420] 54 Stat. 866, August 27, 1940. [421] Illegal Exportation of War Materials Act, 67 Stat. 577, August 13, 1953, Sec. 1. [422] 49 Stat. 1985, June 29, 1936, Secs. 210, 902 (a). [423] _Id._, Sec. 610. [424] _Id._, Sec. 506. [425] 55 Stat. 59, July 14, 1941, Secs. 1, 34. [426] 55 Stat. 808, December 17, 1941. [427] 57 Stat. 161, June 22, 1943. [428] 50 Stat. 121, June 22, 1943, Sec. 8. [429] 54 Stat. 2668. [430] 54 Stat. 4, November 4, 1939, Sec. 11. [431] Proclamation No. 2375, 54 Stat. 2672, November 4, 1939. CHAPTER VII GOVERNMENT AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION [432] See e.g., the collection of essays edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, _Perpetual War For Perpetual Peace_ (Caldwell, Idaho: 1952, Caxton Press). In his brilliant history of American naval operations during the Second World War, Professor Samuel Eliot Morison leaves little doubt that President Roosevelt recognized the eventual need to come to military grips with Nazi aggression: “President Roosevelt, considerably in advance of public opinion, apprehended the threat to American security contained in the seizure of the Atlantic Coast of France, and the strong possibility of a German invasion of Great Britain.” Samuel Eliot Morison, _The Battle of the Atlantic_, 1939-1943, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947) p. 27. Chapter III, “‘Short of War’ Policy” dramatically describes the efforts of the Administration during the critical months of June 1940-March 1941 to sustain Great Britain by any means at our disposal that did not involve an outright declaration of war by the Germans. In Professor Morison’s estimation, Roosevelt guessed right; Hitler could not afford to bring the United States into the war in 1940 or 1941 despite the trade of destroyers for bases with Britain, Lend-Lease, and American aid to British convoys. _Id._, p. 36. [433] In this regard a group of distinguished American historians wrote to the _New York Times_ as follows: