Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of ThinkingJames, William
Philosophy
Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking
James, William
Pragmatism
There is no RINGING conclusion possible when we compare these types
of thinking, with a view to telling which is the more absolutely true.
Their naturalness, their intellectual economy, their fruitfulness for
practice, all start up as distinct tests of their veracity, and as a
result we get confused. Common sense is BETTER for one sphere of life,
science for another, philosophic criticism for a third; but whether
either be TRUER absolutely, Heaven only knows. Just now, if I understand
the matter rightly, we are witnessing a curious reversion to the
common-sense way of looking at physical nature, in the philosophy of
science favored by such men as Mach, Ostwald and Duhem. According to
these teachers no hypothesis is truer than any other in the sense of
being a more literal copy of reality. They are all but ways of talking
on our part, to be compared solely from the point of view of their USE.
The only literally true thing is REALITY; and the only reality we know
is, for these logicians, sensible reality, the flux of our sensations
and emotions as they pass. 'Energy' is the collective name (according
to Ostwald) for the sensations just as they present themselves (the
movement, heat, magnetic pull, or light, or whatever it may be) when
they are measured in certain ways. So measuring them, we are enabled
to describe the correlated changes which they show us, in formulas
matchless for their simplicity and fruitfulness for human use. They are
sovereign triumphs of economy in thought.
No one can fail to admire the 'energetic' philosophy. But the
hypersensible entities, the corpuscles and vibrations, hold their own
with most physicists and chemists, in spite of its appeal. It seems too
economical to be all-sufficient. Profusion, not economy, may after all
be reality's key-note.
I am dealing here with highly technical matters, hardly suitable for
popular lecturing, and in which my own competence is small. All the
better for my conclusion, however, which at this point is this. The
whole notion of truth, which naturally and without reflexion we assume
to mean the simple duplication by the mind of a ready-made and given
reality, proves hard to understand clearly. There is no simple test
available for adjudicating offhand between the divers types of thought
that claim to possess it. Common sense, common science or corpuscular
philosophy, ultra-critical science, or energetics, and critical or
idealistic philosophy, all seem insufficiently true in some regard and
leave some dissatisfaction. It is evident that the conflict of these so
widely differing systems obliges us to overhaul the very idea of truth,
for at present we have no definite notion of what the word may mean. I
shall face that task in my next lecture, and will add but a few words,
in finishing the present one.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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