The second great thing of “Individuality and Value” is its insistence upon the need to all philosophy of a recognized grasp of the principle of “Meaning.”[377] What this instance implies to Dr. Bosanquet is, that “_at no point in our lives_ [either] as [agents or] thinkers are we to accept any supposed element of fact or circumstance as having _any significance_” apart from the great “whole” or the great “reality,” with which we believe ourselves to be in contact in our daily experience, when interpreted in the light of our consciousness of ourselves as persons. In the letter of the book his interpretation of the great “whole,” or the great reality, of life is by no means as broad and as deep as the one at which we have just hinted in attempting to describe his position. But overriding altogether the mere intellectualism of Dr. Bosanquet’s interpretation, is the fact of the _dynamic idealism_ for which he virtually stands,[378] in virtue of the great and the simple effort of his lectures[379] to find “value” in “our daily experience with its _huge obstinate plurality of independent facts_.” He would start, as we mentioned (at the beginning of this chapter), with what he believes to be “the daily transformation of our experience as verified within what we uncritically take as our private consciousness, so far as its weakness may permit,” and “as verified on a larger scale when we think of _such splendid creations as the State and fine art and religion_,” and when we think, too, of “_the mode of our participation in them_.” Now again nothing could indeed be more nobly true (in idea) of the great work of the philosopher than the proper theory and description of this “daily transformation” of our lives, out of the life of “sense” and the life of selfishness, into the spiritual communion[380] that is the essence of all right thinking and all right living. But we may go further than all this and signalize one or two things in Dr. Bosanquet that we venture to construe as a kind of unconscious testimony, on his part, to the very humanism for which we have been contending throughout. The things to which we refer are, firstly, his use of the word “belief”[381] in speaking of his opinion that the work of philosophy has in the main been accomplished, and, second, his fine and really praiseworthy[382] confession that his lectures, whatever they may have done or may not have done, at least “contain the record of a very strong conviction.” Dr. Bosanquet’s departure, in the letter of his argumentation, from the spirit of these declarations only accentuates what we regard as the regrettable failure and abstractionism of his whole official (or professed) philosophy.