Then, secondly, there is a veritable crop of difficulties that arise out of his contention that our intellect is adapted “only to matter.” What, for example, of the various non-utilitarian[415] intuitions of art and morality and religion, that are as undoubtedly facts of our conscious experience as is our comprehension and utilisation of “matter” for the various purposes of civilisation?[416] If it be literally true that our understanding is “incapacitated” for the comprehension of life and of the creative activities of the soul, a new set of categories and a higher form of intelligence (than the merely material) must be elaborated for this special purpose. And if this higher form of intelligence be the “intuition” of which Bergson undoubtedly makes so much, then he must be more careful than he often is in suggesting that intuition and a philosophy of our intuitions “must go _counter to the intellect_.”[417] His theory of art reduces itself, for example, in the main to the negative contention that spiritual perception is always simply “anti-mechanical,”[418] simply the power of seeing things in another way than that of the engineer or the craftsman, the _homo faber_. Thirdly, there are many dualisms or oppositions in his doctrine or expressed teaching, reducible all of them to the one great Cartesian dualism between the mind and the matter that are said by him to intersect in memory, and in perception, and in the life of the spirit generally--the opposition, for example, between instinct and intelligence, that between intelligence and intuition,[419] between the “mechanical” and the “organic,” between the “upward” and the “downward” movements that he attributes to the life-force. And there is a striking inconsistency between his apparent acceptance of the teaching of Kant in respect of the limitations of the physical and the temporal way of looking at things (ourselves included and our actions) and his belief in an eternal “duration,”[420] or movement, or process of which he is always speaking as the very life and texture of everything. This “real” or “pure” “duration” is a thing that troubles all students of his philosophy; it seems to make Bergson believe in what James talked of as a “strung-along” universe. And there is an inconsistency between the supremacy that he seems willing to accord to mind and spirit in the case of the new individuals who are always being born into the world, and the absence of a similar supremacy (or determining rôle) in the case of the mind or spirit without whose existence and operation the universe is unthinkable.[421]