[144] “The mind is not a ‘mirror’ which passively reflects what it chances to come upon. It initiates and tries; and its correspondence with the ‘outer world’ means that its effort successfully meets the environment in behalf of the organic interest from which it sprang. The mind, like an antenna, feels the way for the organism. It gropes about, advances and recoils, making many random efforts and many failures; but it is always urged into taking the _initiative_ by the pressure of interest, and doomed to success or failure in some hour of trial when it meets and engages the environment. Such is mind, and such, according to James, _are all its operations_” (Perry, _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, p. 351). Or the following: “I hope that,” said James in the “lectures” embodied in _Pragmatism_ (New York, 1908) ... “the concreteness and closeness to facts of pragmatism ... may be what approves itself to you as its most satisfactory peculiarity. It only follows here the example of the sister sciences, interpreting the unobserved by the observed. It brings old and new harmoniously together. _It converts the absolutely empty notion of a static relation of ‘correspondence’ between our minds and reality, into that of a rich and active commerce_ (that any one may follow in detail and understand) _between particular thoughts of ours and the great universe of other experiences in which they play their parts and have their uses_” (p. 68; italics mine). [145] “On any view like mine to speak of truth as in the end copying reality, would be senseless” (Bradley in _Mind_, July 1911, “On some Aspects of Truth”). [146] See p. 143 and p. 265. [147] See p. 127 and p. 133. [148] See pp. 148–9. [149] See p. 162. [150] _What is Pragmatism?_ (Pratt), p. 21. [151] _Principles of Pragmatism_, Houghton Mifflin, 1910. [152] _Ibid._, Preface. This last sentence, by the way, may be taken as one of the many illustrations that may be given of the crudities and difficulties of some of the literature of Pragmatism. It shows that Pragmatism may sometimes be as guilty of abstractionism as is Rationalism itself. It is not “experience” that becomes “self-conscious,” but only “persons.” And, similarly, it is only “persons” who pursue “ends” and “satisfy” desires, and who may be said to have a “method.” Professor Bawden, of course, means that it is to the credit of Pragmatism that it approaches experience just as it finds it, and that its chief method is the interpretation of the same experience--an easy thing, doubtless, to profess, but somewhat difficult to carry out. [153] _Principles of Pragmatism_, Houghton Mifflin, 1910, pp. 44–45. [154] P. 253. [155] P. 256. [156] See p. 146. [157] See p. 240 _et ff._ [158] Wallace’s _Logic of Hegel_, p. 304.