[223] Cf. p. 13. [224] _The New Knowledge_, p. 255. [225] It would indeed be easy to quote from popular writers of the day, like Mr. Chesterton or Mr. A. C. Benson or Mr. H. G. Wells, to show that a knowledge of the existence of Pragmatism as a newer experimental or “sociological” philosophy is now a commonplace of the day. Take the following, for example, from Mr. Wells’s _Marriage_ (p. 521): “It was to be a pragmatist essay, a sustained attempt to undermine the confidence of all that scholastic logic-chopping which still lingers like the _sequelae_ of a disease in our University philosophy ... a huge criticism and cleaning up of the existing methods of formulation as a preliminary to the wider and freer discussion of those religious and social issues our generation still shrinks from.” “It is grotesque,” he said, “and utterly true that the sanity and happiness of all the world lies in its habits of generalization.” [226] I cannot meantime trace, or place, this quotation, although I remember copying it out of something by Karl Pearson. [227] In the _Literary Digest_ for 1911. [228] See p. 234. [229] From a letter to Mrs. Humphry Ward, quoted in A. C. Benson’s _Walter Pater_, p. 200. [230] Lecture I. towards the beginning. [231] See p. 62 and p. 197. It should be remembered that our reasoned opinions rest upon our working beliefs. [232] Vol. ii. p. 86. [233] See the reference in Chapter II. p. 26 to the opportunistic ethic of Prezzolini. [234] In _What is Pragmatism?_ Macmillan & Co. [235] Cf. p. 81. [236] Professor Pratt makes an attempt in his book on _What is Pragmatism?_ (pp. 75–6–7) to show that the true meaning of the “correspondence theory” is not inconsistent with Pragmatism or that Pragmatism is not inconsistent with this truth. [237] Cf. _supra_, p. 64. [238] See the Note on p. 21. [239] Cf. _supra_, p. 67. [240] Papini, in fact (in 1907), went the length of saying that you cannot even _define_ Pragmatism, admitting that it appeals only to certain kinds of persons. [241] For a serviceable account, in English, of the differences between the pragmatist philosophy of hypotheses and the more fully developed philosophy of science of the day, see Father Walker’s _Theories of Knowledge_, chapter xiii., upon “Pragmatism and Physical Science.” [242] Cf. _supra_, p. 10 and p. 15. And this failure to systematize becomes, it should be remembered, all the more exasperating, in view of the prominence given by the pragmatists to the supreme principles of “end” and “consequences.” [243] In the “Axioms as Postulates” essay in _Personal Idealism_.