And as another illustration of his tendency to transform ethical facts in the light of a metaphysical, or a logical, theory [they are the same thing to him] we may quote the emphatic declaration on p. 356: “_Our effort has been to bring the conception of moral_ and individual initiative _nearer to the idea of logical determination_,” or the equally outspoken declaration on p. 353: “_But metaphysical theory, viewing the self in its essential basis_ of moral solidarity with the natural and social world ... _cannot admit_ that the independence of the self, _though a fact, is more than a partial fact_.” Or the words at the top of this same page: “The primary principle _that should govern the whole discussion_ is this, that the attitude of moral judgment and responsibility for decisions _is only one among other attitudes_ and spheres of experience.” These last words alone would prove definitely the non-ethical character of “Individuality and Value.” The ethical life is to its author only a “_quatenus consideratur_,” only a possible point of view, only an aspect of reality, only an aspect, therefore, of a “logical system.” Now if the ethical life of the world is to count for anything at all, it may be said that the ethical life is no mere aspect of the life of the self, and no mere aspect of the life of the world, seeing that “nature” in the sense of mere “physical nature” does not come into the sphere of morality at all. It is rather the activity of the “whole self,” or the “normative” reflection of the self as a whole upon all the merely partial or subordinate aspects of its activity, upon bodily life, economic life, intellectual activity, and so on that constitutes the world of morality. [370] See p. 147, and p. 244. [371] Good and evil to Dr. Bosanquet are two quasi-rational systems in active antagonism as claiming to attach different “principles and predicates” to identical data. The essence of their antagonism to Dr. Bosanquet is not, however, that evil is contemplated, as it must be sooner or later, in repentance for example as _wrong_, but rather that the “evil” is an imperfect “_logical_ striving (p. 351) of the self _after unity_” which is in “contradiction with a _fuller_ and sounder striving” after the same. The evil self is to him merely the vehicle of a logical contradiction in the self.