Aile Freiheits-Apostel, sie waren mir immer zuwider. Willkur suchte doch nur jeder am Ende für sich. Willst du viele befrein, so wag’ es vielen zu dienen. Wie gefährlich das sey, willst du es wissen? Versuch’s.[324] Until Pragmatism then makes it clear that it is the free rational activity, and the higher spiritual nature of man that is to it the norm of all our thought, and all our activity, and the true test of all “consequences,” it has not risen to the height of the distinctive message that it is capable of giving to the thought of the present time. Unqualified by some of the ideal considerations to which we have attempted, in its name, and in its interest, to give an expression, it would not be, for example, a philosophy that could be looked upon by the great East as the last word of our Western wisdom or our Western experience. It will be well, however, to say nothing more in this connexion until we have looked at the considerations that follow (in our next chapter) upon the lofty, but impersonal, idealisation of the life and thought of man attempted by our Anglo-Hegelian Rationalism, and until we have reflected, too, upon the more feasible form of Idealism attempted in the remarkable philosophy of Bergson,[325] the greatest of all the pragmatists. CHAPTER VIII PRAGMATISM AND ANGLO-HEGELIAN RATIONALISM The form of Anglo-German Rationalism or Intellectualism which I shall venture to select for the purposes of consideration from the point of view of Pragmatism and Humanism is the first volume of the recent _Gifford Lectures_ of Dr. Bernard Bosanquet, who has long been regarded by the philosophical public of Great Britain as one of the most characteristic members of a certain section of our Neo-Hegelian school. I shall first give the barest outline of the argument and contentions of “The Principle of Individuality and Value,” and then venture upon some paragraphs of what shall seem to me to be relevant criticism.