in such a useless fancy as a teleology of this kind. Thus teleology is really blotted out altogether of existence in this volume, and with its disappearance there must go also the notion of any value that might be intelligibly associated with the idea of the attainment of purposes or ends by the human beings with whom we are acquainted in our ordinary daily life. We shall below[352] refer to the fact that this rejection of teleology and value is one that must be regarded as fatal to ethics or to Absolutism in the realm of ethics. It requires, too, to be added here that even the most unprejudiced reading of Dr. Bosanquet’s work must create in the mind of the reader the conviction that its author is altogether unfair to the views of those who believe in the existence of definite manifestations of purpose in human life.[353] He talks as if those who uphold this idea or this fact are committed either to the absurd notion that man is “the end of the universe,” or to the equally absurd notion that “art, thought, society, history, in which mind begins to transcend its finiteness should be ascribed to the directive abilities of units in a plurality, precisely apart from the world content and the underlying solidarity of spirits, the medium through which all great things are done.” With a view of bringing our discussion of these striking _Gifford Lectures_ within the scope of the general subject of this book the following might be regarded as their leading, fundamental characteristics to which the most serious kind of exception might well be taken: (1) its “abstractionism”[354] and its general _injustice to fact_ due to its initial and persistent “conviction”[355] [strange to say, this is the very word used by Bosanquet] that the real movement in things is a “logical” movement; (2) its fallacious conception of the task of philosophy as mainly the obligation to think the world “without contradiction”; (3) its obvious tendency in the direction of the “subjective idealism”[356] that has been the bane of so much modern philosophy and that is discarded altogether[357] by Pragmatism and Humanism; (4) its retention of many of the characteristic polemical[358] faults of Neo-Hegelianism and its manifestation of a similar spirit of polemical unfairness[359] on the part of their accomplished author; (5) its implication in several really hopeless contradictions in addition to the broad contradiction already referred to; (6) its failure [a common Neo-Hegelian failing] to do justice to the spirit and (in certain important regards) the letter of Kant; (7) its essential non-moralism or its apparently anti-ethical character.