(3) The conception of ethics as a “normative science” and of conduct as free and autonomous,[370] and as the voluntary affirmation of a norm or standard or type or ideal, is conspicuous by its absence. (4) There is really no place either in Dr. Bosanquet’s “concrete universal” or in his fugitive pages upon ethics for the reality of the distinction between good and evil (as “willed” in actions or as present in dispositions and tendencies). Good and evil[371] are for him, “contents” either for himself as a spectator of man’s actions, or for the “concrete universal,” or the “whole,” or the completed “individual” of his too consummate book. (5) Like nearly all forms of Absolutism (Hegelianism, Neo-Hegelianism, Spinozism, Hobbism) Dr. Bosanquet’s ethics (or the vestigial ethics with which he leaves us) comes perilously near to what is known as Determinism[372] or Fatalism or even Materialism. As for the first of the preceding five points, it is perfectly evident that any discussion of the various psychological phenomena that are doubtless involved in conduct can be regarded as but a preliminary step to the discussion of the real problems of ethics--that of the actions and habits and standards of persons who are the subjects of rights and duties and who affirm certain actions to be right, and certain other actions to be wrong. The point, however, about Dr. Bosanquet’s psychological abstractionism, especially when it rises to the height of writing as if the “self” as the “active form of a totality of striving,” or the “self as it happens to be,” were the same thing as the “personal self” with which we alone are mainly concerned in ethics, is that it is but another instance of the old “spectator”[373] fallacy that we have already found to underlie his whole treatment of the “self” and of “purpose” and of “striving.” Such a philosophy, or point of view, is quite foreign to ethics, because it is only in the ethical life that we think of ourselves as “persons,” as beings playing a part, as actors or players upon the great stage of life. By not facing the ethical life directly, from within, instead of from without, Dr. Bosanquet has entirely failed to understand it. And if he had attempted this internal consideration of “personality,” his whole metaphysic of “individuality” and of the great society of beings who inhabit (or who may be thought of as inhabiting) this universe, would have been very different from what it is.