Prejudices, fourth seriesMencken, H. L. (Henry Louis)
History
Prejudices, fourth series
Mencken, H. L. (Henry Louis)
American essays -- 20th century; American literature -- History and criticism; Literature -- History and criticism
The doctrine that every critic worth reading is primarily an
artist--that his fundamental aim is not to ascertain the truth, or
to mete out justice, or to defend the maxims of Aristotle, or the
Ten Commandments, or the statues of the Harvard Corporation, or the
Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, or the Mann Act--this doctrine seems to
give a great deal of offense to pedagogues, and every time one of them
mentions it he mourns. Always he makes the accusation that it relieves
the critic of his most important duty, to wit, the duty of telling
his readers what the thing he criticizes is, and how far it carries
out its pretension, and how it relates itself to other things in the
same category, or presumably in the same category. The answer here,
of course, is that no such duty exists. Its existence, indeed, is no
more than a delusion of pedagogues, who invariably labor under the
notion that they have said something about this or that when they have
given it a name. That delusion is responsible for all of the so-called
“criticism” that pedagogues write--the heavy, soggy essays upon Matthew
Arnold, Poe as a poet, Browning as a philosopher, the Pre-Raphaelites,
Henley, Schiller, Ibsen, Whitman, Milton, Herrick, Molière--in brief,
all the blowsy efforts to reach “definite judgments” that such tedious
wind-jammers delight in. What is accomplished by such “definitive
judgments”? Absolutely nothing. A hedge Lowell’s elaborate treatise
upon Joaquin Miller will never convince any intelligent man that Miller
was an important writer, nor will the same professor’s effort to fit
Ralph Waldo Emerson into the Methodist æsthetic and gnosiology ever
stop any intelligent man from reading Emerson for himself, and enjoying
him more or less. Such “criticism” invariably fails of its ostensible
purpose. In so far as it has any validity and significance at all, it
is not as jurisprudence but as work of art. In brief, the pedagogue,
when he essays criticism, becomes an artist in spite of himself. As a
moral man, of course, he avoids the sin of being a good artist, but
nevertheless he is, within the limits set by his superstitions, an
artist.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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