(156.) 7th, If we can either find produced by nature, or produce
designedly for ourselves, two instances which agree _exactly_ in all
but one particular, and differ in that one, its influence in producing
the phenomenon, if it have any, _must_ thereby be rendered sensible.
If that particular be present in one instance and wanting altogether
in the other, the production or non-production of the phenomenon will
decide whether it be or be not the only cause: still more evidently,
if it be present _contrariwise_ in the two cases, and the effect be
thereby reversed. But if its total presence or absence only produces
a change in the _degree_ or intensity of the phenomenon, we can then
only conclude that it acts as a concurrent cause or condition with
some other to be sought elsewhere. In nature, it is comparatively
rare to find instances pointedly differing in one circumstance and
agreeing in every other; but when we call experiment to our aid, it
is easy to produce them; and this is, in fact, the grand application
of _experiments of enquiry_ in physical researches. They become more
valuable, and their results clearer, in proportion as they possess this
quality (of agreeing exactly in all their circumstances but one), since
the question put to nature becomes thereby more pointed, and its answer
more decisive.
(157.) 8th, If we cannot obtain a complete negative or opposition of
the circumstance whose influence we would ascertain, we must endeavour
to find cases where it varies considerably in degree. If _this_ cannot
be done, we may perhaps be able to weaken or exalt its influence by
the introduction of some fresh circumstance, which, abstractedly
considered, seems _likely_ to produce this effect, and thus obtain
indirect evidence of its influence. But then we are always to remember,
that the evidence so obtained _is_ indirect, and that the new
circumstance introduced _may_ have a direct influence of its own, or
may exercise a modifying one on some _other_ circumstance.
(158.) 9th, Complicated phenomena, in which several causes concurring,
opposing, or quite independent of each other, operate at once, so as to
produce a compound effect, may be simplified by subducting the effect
of all the known causes, as well as the nature of the case permits,
either by deductive reasoning or by appeal to experience, and thus
leaving, as it were, a _residual phenomenon_ to be explained. It is by
this process, in fact, that science, in its present advanced state, is
chiefly promoted. Most of the phenomena which nature presents are very
complicated; and when the effects of all known causes are estimated
with exactness, and subducted, the residual facts are constantly
appearing in the form of phenomena altogether new, and leading to the
most important conclusions.
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