differ very materially from that of the proportion of the remission in Great Britain.' The second argument appears to be more plausible; but it is mischievous, in a high degree, and dangerous; except to a slight extent, it is completely fallacious. Ireland, it is allowed, contributes from L7,300,000 to L7,800,000 to the exchequer; but of this sum L5,000,000 and upwards are expended on her; she really hardly pays L2,000,000 to the State; the L5,000,000 therefore, or nearly all this sum, create a just counterclaim against her, even admitting she is excessively taxed. This expenditure on Ireland, it is contended, is for Irish 'local' purposes; it is not expenditure for 'Imperial' purposes; the account, as between Great Britain and Ireland, is to be taken as if all this expenditure, or nearly so, were purely local. But is not the expenditure for keeping up the Lord-Lieutenant and his Court, is not the expenditure on the government and administration of Ireland, essentially, and in the main, Imperial, and not local in a legitimate sense, so long as the United Kingdom exists? Is it not as Imperial, at least for the most part, as the expenditure on the British army and navy and on the government and administration of England and Scotland is Imperial, and not, properly speaking, local? This argument could be retorted with decisive effect, if urged in the interest of Ireland against Great Britain. If this kind of expenditure in Ireland is held to be local, not Imperial, the same rule must apply to England and Scotland; this expenditure in their case must be local and not Imperial. Why, then, should Ireland contribute to such charges as public works in Edinburgh and London, as the maintenance of the great English dockyards and harbours, as the cost of the army and navy outside Ireland, and of the government and administration of England and Scotland? Clearly on the Treasury hypothesis she should not contribute; and if she does, she has an immense counterclaim, so far as her contributions are applied to these local objects. But, in truth, this whole argument, when examined, is a mere sophism. The revenues of the Three Kingdoms are paid into a common exchequer; they are distributed according to the uses of the State; this expenditure, as a general rule, must be held to be Imperial, not local, and cannot give a part of the Three Kingdoms a right to make a claim against another. The State spends millions on London which it does not spend on Surrey; it spends millions in Hants which it does not spend in Berkshire: does this circumstance give Surrey or Berkshire a title to say we can make a demand on London and Hants? Precisely in the same way, the expenditure of the State on Ireland, as contra-distinguished from that on Great Britain, cannot, at least as a general principle, give Great Britain a right to make a counterclaim on Ireland.