To promise to give them independence when it is “prudent” to do so, or when they are “fit” for it, of course implies that they are not fit for it now, and that it would be imprudent to give it to them now. But as we must ourselves be the judges as to when they become “fit,” and when it would be “prudent” to keep such a promise if it were made, it necessarily follows that to make such a promise now would amount to a deception upon the Filipinos. * * * * * It may well be that our opponents have no real intention of putting their promise into effect. If this is the case, if, in other words, they are insincere in the promise they make, it is only necessary to say again that it is unwise to trust men who are false in one thing to deal with anything. The mere consciousness of broken faith would hamper them in continuing our policy in the islands; and only by continuing unchanged this policy can the honor of the country be maintained, or the interests of the islands subserved. If, on the other hand, our opponents came into power and attempted to carry out their promises to the Filipinos by giving them independence, and withdrawing American control from the islands, the result would be a frightful calamity to the Filipinos themselves, and in its larger aspect would amount to an international crime. Anarchy would follow; and the most violent anarchic forces would be directed partly against the civil government, partly against all forms of religious and educational civilization. Bloody conflicts would inevitably ensue in the archipelago, and just as inevitably the islands would become the prey of the first Power which in its own selfish interest took up the task we had cravenly abandoned. Of course, the practical difficulty in adopting any such course of action—such a “policy of scuttle,” as President McKinley called it—would be found wellnigh insuperable. If it is morally indefensible to hold the archipelago as a whole under our tutelage in the interest of its own people, then it is morally indefensible to hold any part of it. In such case, what right have we to keep a coaling station? What right to keep control over the Moro peoples? What right to protect the Igorrotes from their oppressors? What right to protect the law-abiding friends of America in the islands from treachery, robbery, and murder? Yet, to abandon the islands completely, without even retaining a coaling station, would mean to abandon the position in the competition for the trade of the Orient which we have acquired during the last six years; and what is far more important, it would mean irreparable damage to those who have become the wards of the Nation. To abandon all control over the Moros would amount to releasing these Moros to prey upon the Christian Filipinos, civilized or semi-civilized, as well as upon the commerce of other peoples. The Moros are in large part still in the stage of culture where the occupations of the bandit and