A careful study of the reports seems to establish a strong probability that the following are the facts: The sea-level canal would be slightly less exposed to damage in the event of war; the running expenses, apart from the heavy cost of interest on the amount employed to build it, would be less; and for small ships the time of transit would probably be less. On the other hand, the lock canal at a level of eighty feet or thereabout would not cost much more than half as much to build and could be built in about half the time, while there would be very much less risk connected with building it, and for large ships the transit would be quicker; while, taking into account the interest on the amount saved in building, the actual cost of maintenance would be less. After being built it would be easier to enlarge the lock canal than the sea-level canal. Moreover, what has been actually demonstrated in making and operating the great lock canal, the Soo, a more important artery of traffic than the great sea-level canal, the Suez, goes to support the opinion of the minority of the Consulting Board of Engineers and of the majority of the Isthmian Canal Commission as to the superior safety, feasibility, and desirability of building a lock canal at Panama. The law now on our statute books seems to contemplate a lock canal. In my judgment a lock canal as herein recommended is advisable. If the Congress directs that a sea-level canal be constructed its direction will of course be carried out. Otherwise the canal will be built on substantially the plan for a lock canal outlined in the accompanying papers, such changes being made of course as may be found actually necessary; including possibly the change recommended by the Secretary of War as to the site of the dam on the Pacific side. MESSAGE COMMUNICATED TO THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS, MARCH 5, 1906 _To the Senate and House of Representatives_: Our coast defences as they existed in 1860 were not surpassed in efficiency by those of any country, but within a few years the introduction of rifled cannon and armor in the navies of the world, against which the smoothbore guns were practically useless, rendered them obsolete. For many years no attempt was made to remedy the deficiencies of these seacoast fortifications. There was no establishment in the country equipped for the manufacture of high-power rifled guns; there was no definite adopted policy of coast defence, and Congress was reluctant to undertake a work the cost of which could not be stated even approximately and the details of which had not advanced, so far as could be ascertained, beyond the experimental stages.