"The proposition of non-intervention is: 'By the Compromise of 1850, the Kansas Nebraska act, and other declarations of its will, Congress renounced the exercise of any direct jurisdiction over the territories, and delegated its power to the local legislatures.' But it concedes that Congress could bestow no authority on the local legislatures of which it was not itself possessed'--in other words, "Congress cannot delegate more power than it possesses itself; and it has none to prohibit slavery. Very well, and so good as to the power. But there is a positive duty to be discharged as well as a power not to be exercised. Suppose the territorial legislature attempts to prohibit slavery, and thus do what Congress itself cannot do in the territories. Has Congress renounced its jurisdiction in the case? Could it or can it do so? If not, what is its duty? Does non-intervention renounce this duty of protection, in such a case, or not? It replies that this claim upon Congress to discharge this duty will be vain. Why? There is a dead majority against us in Congress, and they will not heed the appeal to the legislative department for protection. "Well, but the case supposes a like dead majority and an aggressive majority against us in the territorial legislature too.--What then? There is no refuge of safety from a majority against us in territorial legislatures. Non-intervention quickly answers this dilemma, by saying: 'let the courts determine between us and our adversaries.' This is what is called 'remitting' the question to the judiciary, which may decide as well as the Congress or the Executive.--True, the judiciary may and must decide, anyhow, in either case, for that was no discovery of Mr. Calhoun, but a Constitutional function, which has ever belonged to the courts, and of which Congress and the Executive and the Territorial authorities cannot deprive them; and, without any remission by Congress, the judiciary department has the power of deciding upon the validity of laws. And it can as well and more directly pass upon the validity of laws enacted by Congress itself as upon the validity of those enacted by the territorial legislatures. If Congress passes an unconstitutional law, we can go to the courts, just as easy as if the law was passed by its delegate, the territorial Legislature. And if Congress does not renounce its direct jurisdiction and delegate it to the territorial legislature, then the latter will have no power to annoy the slave property locally by its abuse of delegated power; and the territorial legislature is more apt to pass a prohibition than Congress is, for very obvious reasons. The eye of the whole nation is immediately upon Congress, and no positive code is required to establish its power and duty to protect persons and property.