But it may be said further that willing and feeling are not only the origin of cognitions of goodness; but that to will a thing, or to have a certain feeling towards a thing, is the _same thing_ as to think it good. And it may be admitted that even this is _generally_ true in a sense. It does seem to be true that we hardly ever think a thing good, and never very decidedly, without at the same time having a special attitude of feeling or will towards it; though it is certainly not the case that this is true universally. And the converse may possibly be true universally: it may be the case that a perception of goodness is included in the complex facts which we mean by willing and by having certain kinds of feeling. Let us admit then, that to think a thing good and to will it are _the same thing_ in this sense, that, wherever the latter occurs, the former also occurs as a _part_ of it; and even that they are _generally the same thing_ in the converse sense, that when the former occurs it is generally a part of the latter. =80.= These facts may seem to give countenance to the general assertion that to think a thing good is to prefer it or approve it, in the sense in which preference and approval denote certain kinds of will or feeling. It seems to be always true that when we thus prefer or approve, there is included in that fact the fact that we think good; and it is certainly true, in an immense majority of instances, that when we think good, we also prefer or approve. It is natural enough, then, to say that to think good is to prefer. And what more natural than to add: When I say a thing is good, I _mean_ that I prefer it? And yet this natural addition involves a gross confusion. Even if it be true that to think good is the same thing as to prefer (which, as we have seen, is _never_ true in the sense that they are absolutely identical; and not _always_ true, even in the sense that they occur together), yet it is not true that _what_ you think, when you think a thing good, is _that_ you prefer it. Even if your thinking the thing good is the same thing as your preference of it, yet the goodness of the thing--that _of_ which you think--is, for that very reason, obviously _not_ the same thing as your preference of it. Whether you have a certain thought or not is one question; and whether what you think is true is quite a different one, upon which the answer to the first has not the least bearing. The fact that you prefer a thing does not tend to shew that the thing is good; even if it does shew that you think it so.