fact that volition, or some form of volition, _includes_ a _cognition_ of goodness, that will can have the same relation to ethical, which cognition has to metaphysical, propositions. Accordingly the fact of volition, _as a whole_, that is, if we include in it the element which makes it volition and distinguishes it from cognition, has _not_ the same relation to ethical propositions which cognition has to those which are metaphysical. Volition and cognition are _not_ coordinate ways of experiencing, since it is only in so far as volition denotes a _complex_ fact, which includes in it the one identical simple fact, which is meant by _cognition_, that volition is a way of experiencing at all. But, (3) if we allow the terms ‘volition’ or ‘will’ to stand for ‘thinking good,’ although they certainly do not commonly stand for this, there still remains the question: What connection would this fact establish between volition and Ethics? Could the enquiry into what was willed be identical with the ethical enquiry into what was good? It is plain enough that they could not be identical; though it is also plain why they should be thought so. The question ‘What is good?’ is confused with the question ‘What is thought good?’ and the question ‘What is true?’ with the question ‘What is thought true?’ for two main reasons. (1) One of these is the general difficulty that is found in distinguishing what is cognised from the cognition of it. It is observed that I certainly cannot cognise anything that is true without cognising it. Since, therefore, whenever I know a thing that is true, the thing is certainly cognised, it is assumed that for a thing to _be_ true at all is the same thing as for it to be cognised. And (2) it is not observed that certain words, which are supposed to denote only peculiar species of cognition, do as a matter of fact _also_ denote that the object cognised is true. Thus if ‘perception’ be taken to denote only a certain kind of mental fact, then, since the object of it is always true, it becomes easy to suppose that to be true means only to be object to a mental state of that kind. And similarly it is easy to suppose that to be truly good differs from being falsely thought so, solely in respect of the fact that to be the former is to be the object of a volition differing from that of which an apparent good is the object, in the same way in which a perception (on this supposition) differs from an illusion.