one particular existing thing is good, with the proposition that the existence of that kind of thing _would_ be good, wherever it might occur. To the proof of the former proposition Metaphysics might be relevant, by shewing that the thing existed; to the proof of the latter it is wholly irrelevant: it can only serve the _psychological_ function of suggesting things which may be valuable--a function which would be still better performed by pure fiction (69-71). But the most important source of the supposition that Metaphysics is relevant to Ethics, seems to be the assumption that ‘good’ _must_ denote some _real_ property of things--an assumption which is mainly due to two erroneous doctrines, the first _logical_, the second _epistemological_. Hence (3) I discussed the _logical_ doctrine that all propositions assert a relation between existents; and pointed out that the assimilation of ethical propositions either to natural laws or to commands are instances of this _logical_ fallacy (72-76). And finally (4) I discussed the _epistemological_ doctrine that to be good is equivalent to being willed or felt in some particular way; a doctrine which derives support from the analogous error, which Kant regarded as the cardinal point of his system and which has received immensely wide acceptance--the erroneous view that to be ‘true’ or ‘real’ is equivalent to being thought in a particular way. In this discussion the main points to which I desire to direct attention are these: (_a_) That Volition and Feeling are _not_ analogous to Cognition in the manner assumed; since in so far as these words denote an attitude of the mind towards an object, they are themselves merely instances of Cognition: they differ only in respect of the kind of object of which they take cognisance, and in respect of the other mental accompaniments of such cognitions: (_b_) That universally the _object_ of a cognition must be distinguished from the cognition of which it is the object; and hence that in no case can the question whether the object is _true_ be identical with the question how it is cognised or whether it is cognised at all: it follows that even if the proposition ‘This is good’ were always the object of certain kinds of will or feeling, the _truth_ of that proposition could in no case be established by proving that it was their object; far less can that proposition itself be identical with the proposition that its subject is the object of a volition or a feeling (77-84). CHAPTER V. ETHICS IN RELATION TO CONDUCT.