its appearing so to us, is _not_ the reason why it is true: for we mean that it has absolutely no reason. It would not be a self-evident proposition, if we could say of it: I cannot think otherwise and therefore it is true. For then its evidence or proof would not lie in itself, but in something else, namely our conviction of it. That it appears true to us may indeed be the _cause_ of our asserting it, or the reason why we think and say that it is true: but a reason in this sense is something utterly different from a logical reason, or reason why something is true. Moreover, it is obviously not a reason of the same thing. The _evidence_ of a proposition to us is only a reason for _our holding it_ to be true: whereas a logical reason, or reason in the sense in which self-evident propositions have no reason, is a reason why _the proposition itself_ must be true, not why we hold it so to be. Again that a proposition is evident to us may not only be the reason why we do think or affirm it, it may even be a _reason_ why we ought to think it or affirm it. But a reason, in this sense too, is not a logical reason for the truth of the proposition, though it is a logical reason for the rightness of holding the proposition. In our common language, however, these three meanings of ‘reason’ are constantly confused, whenever we say ‘I have a reason for thinking that true.’ But it is absolutely essential, if we are to get clear notions about Ethics or, indeed, about any other, especially any philosophical, study, that we should distinguish them. When, therefore, I talk of Intuitionistic Hedonism, I must not be understood to imply that my denial that ‘Pleasure is the only good’ is _based_ on my Intuition of its falsehood. My Intuition of its falsehood is indeed _my_ reason for _holding_ and declaring it untrue; it is indeed the only valid reason for so doing. But that is just because there is _no_ logical reason for it; because there is no proper evidence or reason of its falsehood except itself alone. It is untrue, because it is untrue, and there is no other reason: but I _declare_ it untrue, because its untruth is evident to me, and I hold that that is a sufficient reason for my assertion. We must not therefore look on Intuition, as if it were an alternative to reasoning. Nothing whatever can take the place of _reasons_ for the truth of any proposition: intuition can only furnish a reason for _holding_ any proposition to be true: this however it must do when any proposition is self-evident, when, in fact, there are no reasons which prove its truth.