But what are we to say of virtue, when it consists in a disposition to be moved to the performance of duties by this idea? It seems difficult to deny that the emotion excited by rightness as such has some intrinsic value; and still more difficult to deny that its presence may heighten the value of some wholes into which it enters. But, on the other hand, it certainly has not more value than many of the motives treated in our last section--emotions of love towards things really good in themselves. And as for Kant’s implication that it is the sole good[24], this is inconsistent with other of his own views. For he certainly regards it as _better_ to perform the actions, to which he maintains that it prompts us--namely, ‘material’ duties--than to omit them. But, if better at all, then, these actions must be better either in themselves or as a means. The former hypothesis would directly contradict the statement that this motive was _sole_ good, and the latter is excluded by Kant himself since he maintains that no actions can _cause_ the existence of this motive. And it may also be observed that the other claim which he makes for it, namely, that it is _always_ good as a means, can also not be maintained. It is as certain as anything can be that very harmful actions may be done from conscientious motives; and that Conscience does not always tell us the truth about what actions are right. Nor can it be maintained even that it is _more_ useful than many other motives. All that can be admitted is that it is one of the things which are generally useful. [24] Kant, so far as I know, never expressly states this view, but it is implied _e.g._ in his argument against Heteronomy. What more I have to say with regard to those elements in some virtues which are good in themselves, and with regard to their relative degrees of excellence, as well as the proof that all of them together cannot be the sole good, may be deferred to the next chapter.