And secondly, (_b_) it may be the case that the existence of that which we contemplate is itself a great positive good, so that, for this reason alone, the state of things described by saying, that the object of our emotion really exists, would be intrinsically superior to that in which it did not. This reason for superiority is undoubtedly of great importance in the case of human affections, where the object of our admiration is the mental qualities of an admirable person; for that _two_ such admirable persons should exist is greatly better than that there should be only one: and it would also discriminate the admiration of inanimate nature from that of its representations in art, in so far as we may allow a small intrinsic value to the existence of a beautiful object, apart from any contemplation of it. But it is to be noticed that this reason would not account for any difference in value between the cases where the truth was believed and that in which it was merely cognised, without either belief or disbelief. In other words, so far as this reason goes, the difference between the two subdivisions of our second class (that of imaginative contemplation) would be as great as between our first class and the second subdivision of our second. The superiority of the mere _cognition_ of a beautiful object, when that object also happened to exist, over the same cognition when the object did not exist, would, on this count, be as great as that of the _knowledge_ of a beautiful object over the mere imagination of it. =119.= These two reasons for discriminating between the value of the three cases we are considering, must, I say, be carefully distinguished from that, of which I am now questioning the validity, if we are to obtain a correct answer concerning this latter. The question I am putting is this: Whether the _whole_ constituted by the fact that there is an emotional contemplation of a beautiful object, which both is believed to be and is _real_, does not derive some of its value from the fact that the object _is_ real? I am asking whether the value of this whole, _as a whole_, is not greater than that of those which differ from it, _either_ by the absence of belief, with or without truth, _or_, belief being present, by the mere absence of truth? I am not asking _either_ whether it is not superior to them as a means (which it certainly is), _nor_ whether it may not contain a more valuable _part_, namely, the existence of the object in question. My question is solely whether the existence of its object does not constitute an addition to the value of the whole, quite distinct from the addition constituted by the fact that this whole does contain a valuable part.