[Footnote 188-2: Numberless bankrupts and unbounded extravagance in Holland. (Richesse de Hollande, II, 168.) In England, the hazardous enterprises of 1825 were very much promoted by the action of the government which a short time before reduced the interest on its state debt. (_Tooke_, History of Prices, II, 148 ff.)] [Footnote 188-3: _J. S. Mill_, IV, ch. 4, 4. When _Ricardo_, ch. 6, says that every increase of productive capital must enhance the value in use, and still more the value in exchange, of a nation's property, but under such circumstances only to the advantage of the working class, and still more of the land owning class, he at least apparently presupposes an improvement, or increase of labor.] [Footnote 188-4: Think only of the so-called commercial crises, the speculation-rage preceding which is excited by the lowness of the rate of interest, the destruction of capital in which makes the rate of interest to retrograde materially. However, this very decline is, in itself, only a spur to speculation in evidences of national indebtedness, stocks, etc., in commodities, only where, without such speculation, a rise in prices was to be expected. Thus, for instance, the great English periods of speculation: 1796 ff., in colonial products; 1808 ff., in raw materials in general; 1814, in articles of export, were times in which there was not the slightest facility in obtaining credit. (_Tooke_, History of Prices, III, 159.)] [Footnote 188-5: Between 1829 and 1849, the highest rate of interest paid by English capital employed in cotton industries was little over 2½ per cent. (Edinb. Rev., April, 1849, 429.)]